by Ryan Streeter on September 15, 2014. Follow Ryan on Twitter.
I’ve long thought a good indicator of a city’s well-being is the share of children who live there. I’ve even applied that thought to both sides of the Atlantic. Joel Kotkin and Wendell Cox have ranked America’s largest 52 metro areas by how much they have grown their youth population.
One might not think that Austin, the epicenter of new-tech and music and food, would appeal to people with kids, but it’s #2 on the list. And, perhaps more surprising, Sin City is #3.
The well-worth-your-while read is here, and the top ten are as follows:
No. 1: Raleigh, N.C. MSA
Rise In No. Of Children Aged 5-14, 2000-13: 55.7%
No. Of Children Aged 5-14, 2013: 177,886
Percentage Of Children Aged 5-14 In Total Population, 2013: 14.6%
No. 2: Austin, Texas
Rise In No. Of Children Aged 5-14, 2000-13: 49.3%
No. Of Children Aged 5-14, 2013: 261,199
Percentage Of Children Aged 5-14 In Total Population, 2013: 13.9%
No. 3: Las Vegas
Rise In No. Of Children Aged 5-14, 2000-13: 39.0%
No. Of Children Aged 5-14, 2013: 275,663
Percentage Of Children Aged 5-14 In Total Population, 2013: 13.6%
No. 4: Charlotte, N.C.
Rise In No. Of Children, 2000-13: 32.9%
No. Of Children, 2013: 331,956
Percentage Of Children In Total Population, 2013: 14.2%
No. 5: Phoenix, Ariz.
Rise In No. Of Children, 2000-13: 29.3%
No. Of Children, 2013: 633,123
Percentage Of Children In Total Population, 2013: 14.4%
No. 6: Dallas-Ft. Worth, Texas
Rise In No. Of Children, 2000-13: 28.2%
No. Of Children, 2013: 1.05 million
Percentage Of Children In Total Population, 2013: 15.4%
No. 7: Atlanta, Ga.
Rise In No. Of Children, 2000-13: 26.1%
No. Of Children, 2013: 808,811
Percentage Of Children In Total Population, 2013: 14.6%
No. 8: Houston, Texas
Rise In No. Of Children, 2000-13: 25.8%
No. Of Children, 2013: 965,259
Percentage Of Children In Total Population, 2013: 15.3%
No. 9: Nashville, Tenn.
Rise In No. Of Children, 2000-13: 22.7%
No. Of Children, 2013: 237,119
Percentage Of Children In Total Population, 2013: 13.5%
No. 10: Orlando, Fla.
Rise In No. Of Children, 2000-13: 22.6%
No. Of Children, 2013: 288,091
Percentage Of Children In Total Population, 2013: 12.7%
by Ryan Streeter on September 7, 2014. Follow Ryan on Twitter.
Here’s another interesting reference in the study I cited in my last post. It shows the positive relationship between CTE and earnings and family formation. This subject, in my view, receives far too little attention from policymakers.
A recent randomized evaluation of Career Academies—a career- oriented high school program that provides small learning communities, emphasis on career paths, and internship opportunities for disadvantaged high school students—lends additional credence to the potential causal link between male earnings capacity and marriage rates. Eight years after students graduated from high school, males who participated in Career Academies due to the experiment were earning on average $361 more per month and were employed almost three months more per year than males who were experimentally assigned to traditional high school programs. Equally remarkable were the differences among Career Academy participants and non-participants in measures of family formation: male participants were 33% more likely to be married and living with their spouse, 30% more likely to be living with their partner and children, and 35% more likely to be the custodial parent of their children.
There are promising alternatives to a 4-year college degree for a large number of Americans, but to date, our policies surrounding these programs and opportunities are unclear, uncoordinated, and largely neglected by elected officials.
by Ryan Streeter on September 7, 2014. Follow Ryan on Twitter.
I was reminded of the Autor-Wasserman “Wayward Sons” study (pdf) when Thomas Edsall referred to it in this column last week. There are some pretty interesting and sobering charts in the study, which I’ll put below with no commentary other than this snippet from the study:
Less-educated males are far less likely than highly-educated males to marry, but they are not less likely to have children. Due to their low marriage rates and low earnings capacity, children of less-educated males face comparatively low odds of living in economically secure households with two parents present. In general, children born into such households face poorer educational and earnings prospects over the long term. Ironically, males born into low-income single-parent headed households—which, in the vast majority of cases are female-headed households—appear to fare particularly poorly on numerous social and educational outcomes. Thus, the poor economic prospects of less-educated males may create differentially large disadvantages for their sons, potentially reinforcing the development of the gender gap in the next generation.
Any adult alive today has lived through a historic shift that has occurred without much fanfare: the movement to a majority-urban global population.
In 1800 only 5% of the world’s population lived in cities, and only one city – Beijing – had more than 1 million people.
What’s especially amazing is the rapid rise of the megacity, defined as a city with more than 10 million residents. In this interesting study by Kotkin, Cox, Modarres, and Renn, we learn:
Until recent decades there were only three (megacities) — Tokyo and New York, joined by a third, Mexico City, only in 1975. Now the megacity has become a global phenomenon that has dispersed around the planet. There were 29 such cities in 2014 and now account for roughly 13% of the world’s urban population and 7% of the world’s total population.
by Ryan Streeter on August 27, 2014. Follow Ryan on Twitter.
The following two maps show both the percentage of native-born residents in a state and the regions from which the migrants to a respective state have come. A lot of states are pretty stable over time in terms of the share of native-born vs. migrant residents. But there are some exceptions. Look at California and Texas, for instance.
Here is America in 1950:
And here is America in 2012:
Whereas most midwestern states have been pretty stable, California has seen its native-born population grow by 18 percentage points, while Texas has seen its share drop by 15 points. Georgia has dropped by a remarkable 30 points.
by Ryan Streeter on August 27, 2014. Follow Ryan on Twitter.
There is less churn in our economy, which is concerning:
Many factors contributed to reduced fluidity: a shift to older firms and establishments, an aging workforce, the transformation of business models and supply chains (as in the retail sector), the impact of the information revolution on hiring practices, and several policy-related developments.
The problem is this:
The loss of labor market fluidity suggests the U.S. economy became less dynamic and responsive in recent decades…These developments raise concerns about productivity growth, which has close links to factor reallocation in prominent theories of innovation and growth and in many empirical studies. The high-tech sector’s sharp drop-off in business entry rates and in the incidence of fast-growing young firms after 2000 reinforces this concern…Our econometric evidence supports the hypothesis that reduced fluidity lowers employment rates, especially for younger and less educated workers.
by Ryan Streeter on August 19, 2014. Follow Ryan on Twitter.
This chart says a lot about how things have changed in the past couple generations:
The share families spend on child care and education for their children has grown from 2% in 1960 to 18% in 2013. Today it accounts for more than any other expense category except housing.
Food, clothing and transportation have together decreased by nearly the same amount that child care and education have increased. As the marketplace has figured out how to bring down the cost of food and clothes, families have changed and figured out that education and child care are essential to success in the marketplace.
There’s a lot to unpack in that dynamic.
This is from a post by Niraj Chokshi at GovBeat.
Very cool infographics showing where all 50 states’ residents have come from over the past 100 years
by Ryan Streeter on August 17, 2014. Follow Ryan on Twitter.
This is fascinating. Using Census data, the authors of this post go back over one hundred years and create cool infographics showing us where residents living in a state in a given year were born.
The result is an amazing set of comparisons showing you which states are home to the most migrants, and where those migrants have come from over the years.
For instance, look at how Montana used to be comprised mostly of outsiders, with more than one in four coming from not just from another state but outside the country:
Or, look at how North Carolina has trended the opposite way as Montana:
New York has remained relatively stable in its proportions over time:
Arizona has also been stable but in a different way, namely it’s always had a majority of people living there who were born somewhere else:
Florida has trended like N. Carolina, but more dramatically so:
California’s domestic migration has constricted in the past couple generations even as it’s global migrants have held pretty steady:
Indiana is a pretty good picture of the pattern you see in the Midwest, which has been almost always the same in its proportion of native-born residents and those from outside the state:
You can scroll through all 50 states here.
by Ryan Streeter on August 14, 2014. Follow Ryan on Twitter.
I find this graph alarming and the underlying data so stunning that you can’t help but wonder why more people don’t write about it.
This is from a Brookings paper by Bob Litan and Ian Hathaway. The graph is alarming because it shows the long-term decline in startups. The underlying data is stunning because it shows that the decline in entrepreneurial activity is nearly universal in the U.S.
This appendix (PDF) to the paper shows that firm entry has declined in almost all of the nation’s 300+ metropolitan areas – even in areas known to be entrepreneurial hotspots like Austin, TX, or the Bay Area. It also shows that the job reallocation rate has declined universally as well. Job reallocation is a good measure of an economy’s dynamism. The literature suggests that the more reallocation you have, the better the wages and job quality, especially for younger workers. So a decline in this area is also a signal of decreasing dynamism.
No one knows for sure why we are seeing fewer and fewer new firms each year. But almost everyone agrees it’s bad, since new firms are responsible for the lion’s share of net new jobs each year. A good many commentators think that the growing regulatory state and healthcare costs have a lot to do with this decline. That certainly checks out anecdotally as you talk to business owners. But you can’t help wonder if something else is going on, too, that we haven’t yet figured out.
by Ryan Streeter on August 12, 2014. Follow Ryan on Twitter.
A new study adds more evidence to a phenomenon that Charles Murray wrote about in Coming Apart, namely that a greater percentage of highly-educated, higher-income people are people of faith than the percentage of lower-educated, lower-income people. This flies in the face of sociological doctrine going back over a hundred years. The study’s author writes:
The assumption that education is a motivating force behind secularization has been integral to sociology since Comte, Durkheim, and Weber, and it remains ingrained in modern sociology (e.g., Ruiter and van Tubergen 2009; Wilson 1982). College or university education, in particular, is seen as a primary cause of secularization (Beckwith 1985; Halman and Draulans 2006; Stark 1963), leading the highly educated to be disproportionately likely to disaffiliate from organized religion (Baker and Smith 2009;Caplovitz and Sherrow 1977; Kosmin and Keysar 2009).
However much that used to be the case, it seems the opposite is now happening. Scott Jaschik summarizes the study’s findings this way:
[T]he evolution of the impact on college attendance was gradual, with those who were born early in the 20th century who were college graduates much less likely to have religious affiliation than those without a college education. For those born in the ’60s, there was no impact one way or the other. And starting for those born in the ’70s, the correlation was between a college education and having a religious affiliation.
Given what we know about how people of faith also demonstrate a range of other positive outcomes, we can only assume that increasing faith among more highly-educated people will contribute to the gap between those experiencing opportunity and those who aren’t.
Note: the study above only considers belief, not religious practice or observance.